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theories which postulate agents use subjective heterogenous beliefs (in short HB). We focus on problems where agents
forecast aggregates such as profit rate of the S&P500 and our model is similar to the one used in the literature on
asset pricing (e.g. Brown and Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Allen, Morris and Shin (2003)). 
We first argue there is no a-priori conceptual basis to assuming PI about economic aggregates. Since PI is not
observed, models with PI offer no testable hypotheses, making it possible to prove anything with PI. In contrast, agents
with HB reveal their forecasts hence data on market belief is used to test hypotheses of HB. We show the common
knowledge assumptions of the PI theory are implausible. The theories differ on four main analytical issues. (1) The
pricing theory under PI implies prices have infinite memory and at each t depend upon unobservable variables. In
contrast, under HB prices have finite memory and depend only upon observable variables. (2) The “Beauty Contest”
implications of the two are different. Under PI today’s price depends upon today’s market belief about tomorrow’s
mean belief about “fundamental” variables. Under HB it depends upon today’s market belief about tomorrow’s
market beliefs. Tomorrow’s beliefs are, in part, beliefs about future beliefs and are often mistaken. Market forecast
mistakes are key to Beauty Contests,  and are a central cause of market uncertainty called “endogenous uncertainty.”
(3) Contrary to PI, theories with HB have wide empirical implications which are testable with available data. (4) PI
theories assume unobserved data and hence do not restrict behavior, while rationality conditions impose restrictions on
any HB theory. We explain the tight restrictions on the model’s parameters imposed by the theory of Rational Beliefs.
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Diversity of belief is an empirical fact. A large and growing body of work has used this
diversity to explain various market phenomena, and there are two theories inspired by it. One follows
the Harsanyii doctrine which views people as Bayesian decision makers who hold the same probability
belief but who have asymmetric private information which they use in forecasting. Examples of papers
that are applicable here includes Phelps (1970), Lucas (1972), Diamond and Verrecchia (1981),
Singleton (1987), Brown and Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Wang (1994), He and
Wang (1995), Hellwig (2002), Judd and Bernardo (1996), (2000), Woodford (2003), Allen, Morris
and Shin (2003) and others. An alternative view holds that there is nothing to justify a common prior
and heterogeneity of probability models is inevitable in a complex world. Moreover, agents clearly do
not have and do not use private information to forecast aggregates such as the S&P 500, GNP growth
rate, exchange rates, inflation or interest rates, yet there is a vast diversity of such forecasts. A sample
of papers which use this approach includes Harrison and Kreps (1978), Varian (1985), (1989), Harris
and Raviv (1993), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Kurz (1994), (1997a), Kurz and Motolese (2001),
Kurz Jin and Motolese (2005a), (2005b), Motolese (2001), (2003), Nielsen (1996),(2003), Wu and
Guo (2003), (2004). In particular, Kurz’s (1994), (1997a) theory of belief diversity stresses the
impossibility of perfect learning. It holds that our environment is non-stationary with technological and
institutional changes occurring faster than we can learn them. But then, how different are these two
theories of belief diversity? What are the differences in their theoretical and empirical implications?
This paper explores the economic structure of asset pricing theories under private information
(in short, PI) compared with the structure of heterogenous beliefs approach (in short, HB), aiming to
3highlights the different theoretical and empirical implications of the two theories. To that end we keep
the formalism down to a minimum, focusing on ideas and concepts. Our discussion is confined to
theories where optimizing agents forecast aggregates such as future S&P500 returns, exchange rates,
interest rates, GDP growth etc. We do not address the problem of forecasting future conditions of
individual firms or establishments. Our main conclusions are that models with PI are not appropriate to
the problem of forecasting economic aggregates and offer contrived solutions. On the other hand,
theories where agents have diverse beliefs and use diverse models constitute a natural setting for
problems of this type. We argue that PI models have virtually no empirical implications and hence with
private information one can prove almost anything. In contras, models with HB have clear empirical
implications and testable hypotheses since market beliefs are observable. 
To explore the key ideas we first outline a simple model used to study asset pricing with
private information. In Section 2 we adapt the model to an environment with HB but without private
information. After fully developing the equilibrium asset pricing theory under HB we compare in
Section 3 the results to those obtained under private information. We explore in Section 3.5 the
restrictions on beliefs proposed by the theory of Rational Beliefs (see Kurz (1994), (1997a)).
1. Asymmetric Information and Asset Pricing
The model reviewed here is an adaptation of the short lived trader model used by Brown and
Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols (1989), Allen, Morris and Shin (2003) and others. Specifying
the model will also provide us with terminology and notation used throughout the paper.
There is a unit mass of traders, indexed by the [0, 1] interval and only one homogenous
aggregate asset (e.g. S&P500 index fund) with unknown intrinsic value Q. The economy is static with
one period divided into three dates (no discounting): in dates 1 traders first receive a public and private
signals about the asset value and then they trade. In date 2 they trade again. In date 3 (or end of date
2) uncertainty is resolved, the true liquidation value Q of the asset is revealed and traders receive this
value for their holdings. The initial information of traders is that Q  is distributed normally with  
E(Q) = y  and variance  . At date 1 each trader also observes a private signal about Q,  1
α
x i ' Q % εi
where   are, independently normally distributed across all i with mean 0 and variance . Since theseεi 1
β
facts are common knowledge, agents know that the true unknown value Q is “in the market” at all
4time since by the law of large numbers the mean of all private signals is the future value Q. All have the
same CARA utility over wealth W, with constant absolute coefficient of risk aversion. They maximize
expected utility  where . Trader  i  starts withu(W i) ' &e &(W i/τ) W i ' S i p1%D i1 ( p2&p1 )%D i2 ( Q&p2 )
Si units of the aggregate asset and can borrow at zero interest to finance trading in it.  are i’s(D i1 , D i2 )
demands in the first and second rounds and  are market prices in the two rounds. Aggregate(p1 , p2 )
supplies (S1, S2) of ownership shares traded in each of the rounds are random, unobserved and
normally distributed. This noise is crucial since it ensures that traders cannot deduce from prices the
true value of Q. In a noisy Rational Expectations Equilibrium (in short, REE) traders maximize
expected utility while markets clear after traders deduce from prices all possible information. Indeed,
Brown and Jennings (1989) show equilibrium price at date 1 is
(1a) p1 ' κ1 (λ1y% µ1 Q & S1 )
and since S1  is normally distributed  p1  is also normally distributed. (1a) shows that since Q and S1 
are both unknown, prices are not fully revealing. Since over trading dates Q is fixed, more rounds of
trading generate more price data from which traders deduce added information about Q. But with
additional supply shocks the inference problem becomes more complicated. That is, at date 2 the price 
p2 contains more information about Q but it depends upon two unobserved noise shocks (S1 , S2).
Hence, as in Brown and Jennings (1989), the price function takes the form
(1b) .p2 ' κˆ2 ( ˆλ2y% µˆ2 Q & S2 % ψS1)
Since the realized noise  S1 is not known at date 2, traders condition on the known price  p1 to infer
the information about S1. They thus use a date 2 price function which takes an equivalent form
.p2 ' κ2 (λ2y% µ2 Q & S2 % ξ21 p1 )
Using (1a) equivalence implies that  Denoteκ2' κˆ2 , λ2 ' (ˆλ2%λ1ψ) , µ2 ' (µˆ2%µ1ψ) and ξ21 ' &
ψ
κ1
.
by the information of  i  in the two rounds. The linearity of the equilibrium price map implies(H i1 , H i2 )
that the payoff is normally distributed. Brown and Jennings (1989) then show in Appendix A that there
exist constants  determined by the covariance matrix of the model’s random variables such(G1 , G2 )
that the demand functions of trader  i are
(2a)  .D i2 ( p2) '
τ
Var i(Q |H i2 )
[ E i(Q|H i2 ) & p2 ]
(2b) .D i1 ( p1 ) '
τ
G1
[E i(p2 | H i1 ) & p1 ] %
( G2 & G1 )
G1
[E i (D i2 | H i1 )]
5It is typically assumed that   independent of  i. The second term in (2b) is theVar i (Q|H i2 ) ' σ2Q
“hedging demand” arising from risk perception of traders at date 1 about price change at date 2. The
hedging demand in a noisy REE complicates the inference problem and raises problems regarding the
existence of equilibrium. As a result, most writers ignore this demand and study the myopic-investor
economy. This concept is framed by regarding traders as long or short lived. A “short lived” trader
lives one period only. He first trades in date 1, gains utility from p2 and leaves the economy. He is
replaced by a new short lived trader who knows the information of the first trader but trades in date 2
and gains utility from the revealed Q. Neither trader has a hedging demand. A “long lived” trader lives
through both periods, trades in dates 1 and  2 hence has a hedging demand. It is then common to
ignore the second term in (2b), average on  i, equate to supply and conclude that
(1c)      , .p2 ' ¯E2(Q) &
σ
2
Q
τ
(S1 % S2 ) p1 ' ¯E1(p2 ) &
G1
τ
S1
 is date 2 average market forecast of  Q and  is average market forecast of  . In this¯E2(Q) ¯E1(p2 ) p2
case  and it is assumed this variance is independent of  i.G1 ' Var
i
1 ( p2 )
(2a)-(2b) depend only upon the condition that prices are normally distributed but not upon any
private information assumption. Hence, the difference between the two theories on which we focus in
this paper result from differences between their implications to the conditional expectations in (2a)-
(2b). For example, (2a) shows p2 depend upon date 2 expectations which are updated based on the
information deduced from p2 and p1. This is different from date 1 information which consists of public
signal, private signals and inference from p1.  Allen, Morris and Shin (2003) present in their Appendix
A computations of the closed form solution. To get an idea of the inference involved we review the
steps they take. What does a trader learn in round 1? Given prior belief  trader  i Q-N(y, 1
α
)
observes .  Since  all he infers from date 1 price is thatp1'κ1 (λ1y%µ1Q&S1 ) S1-N(0 ,1/γ1 )
     . 
1
κ1µ1
( p1 & κ1λ1y) ' Q&
S1
µ1
- N(Q , 1/(µ21γ1) )
But now, his added piece of information is the private signal , . Using ax i ' θ % εi εi-N(0 , 1
β
)
standard Bayesian inference from these three sources, his posterior belief becomes
(3a)       E i( Q|H i1 ) '
αy%βx i%µ21γ1
1
κ1µ1
(p1&κ1λ1y)
α % β % µ21γ1
'
(α&µ1γ1λ1 )y%βx i%
µ1γ1
κ1
p1
α % β % µ21γ1
(3b) with precision      .α % β % µ21γ1
6Averaging (3a) over the population we can see that the average market forecast at date 1 is then
.
¯E1 ( Q|H1 ) '
(α&µ1γ1λ1 ) y%βQ%
µ1γ1
κ1
p1
α % β % µ21γ1
/
αy% (β % µ21γ1 )Q
α % β % µ21γ1
&
µ1γ1 S1
α % β % µ21γ1
In round 2 a trader observes p2 which is a function of the same three variables and of p1.  Given
p1 and the fact that ,  he infers from  that S2 - N(0 ,
1
γ2
) p2'κ2 (λ2y%µ2 Q&S2 % ξ21 p1)
 .
1
κ2µ2
( p2 & κ2λ2y& κ2ξ21 p1 ) ' Q&
S2
µ2
- N( Q , 1
µ22γ2
)
He now updates (3a)-(3b). Since supply shocks are i.i.d. the updated posterior is standard
         .E i(Q |H i2 )'
[
(α&µ1γ1λ1)y%βx i%
µ1γ1
κ1
p1
α % β % µ21γ1
](α%β%µ21γ1) %
1
κ2µ2
(p2&κ2λ2y&κ2ξ21 p1)(µ22γ2)
α % β % µ21γ1 % µ
2
2γ2
Simplification leads to
(4b)    E i( Q | H i2 ) '
[α & µ1γ1λ1 & µ2γ2λ2 ] y% βx i% [
µ1γ1
κ1
p1 %
µ2γ2
κ2
p2 & µ2γ2ξ21 p1]
α % β % µ21γ1 % µ
2
2γ2
(4c)  . Var(Q | H i2 ) ' 1
α%β%µ21γ1%µ
2
2γ2
To compute (1c) we average (4b) to conclude that
(5a) ¯E2 ( Q) '
[α & µ1γ1λ1 & µ2γ2λ2 ] y% βQ% [
µ1γ1
κ1
p1 %
µ2γ2
κ2
p2 & µ2γ2ξ21 p1]
α % β % µ21γ1 % µ
2
2γ2
(5b) .¯E1(p2 ) ' κ2 (λ2y% µ2 ¯E1( Q) % ξ21 p1 )
When (5a)-(5b) are inserted into (1c) we end up with two equations in the two unknown prices which
can now be computed. The final step is to match coefficients of the price functions (1a)-(1b) in order
to identify ( , ξ21). For details of these computations see Allen, Morris and Shinκ1 ,λ1 , µ1 ,κ2 ,λ2 , µ2
3
 For discussion of the “long lived” traders see He and Wang (1995) and Appendix A of Allen, Morris and Shin
(2003). For a simple exposition of the hedging demand in a two period economy see Brown and Jennings (1989).
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(2003) , Appendix A. It is useful to write the forecasts (4b) and (5a) in terms of unknown variables:
(4b’)       E i( Q | H i2 ) '
αy% βx i % ( µ21γ1 % µ22γ2 )Q
α % β % µ21γ1 % µ
2
2γ2
&
µ1γ1S1 % µ2γ2S2
α % β % µ21γ1 % µ
2
2γ2
(5a’) .¯E2 ( Q) '
αy% (β%µ21γ1%µ22γ2 )Q
α % β % µ21γ1 % µ
2
2γ2
&
µ1γ1S1 % µ2γ2S2
α % β % µ21γ1 % µ
2
2γ2
What is the length of memory in prices? The model is static but multiple trading rounds provide
opportunities to deduce more information from prices about  Q,  revealed after N rounds. As trading
continues, the memory of all past prices is preserved since prices depend upon all unobserved supply
shocks. In such a case the price system can never be a finite memory Markovian process. The model
has, indeed, been extended to multi period trading where Q  is revealed N periods later (see Brown
and Jennings (1989), Grundy and McNichols (1989), He and Wang (1995) and Allen, Morris and Shin
(2003)). In these models the complexity of inference depends upon the presence of a hedging demand
of long lived traders3. However, for both long and short lived traders the number of trading rounds is
an arbitrary modeling construct. It would thus be instructive to examine the limit behavior of the
model. In a third round of trading by the short lived traders the price map becomes 
 .p3'κ3 (λ3y%µ3 Q&S3 % ξ31 p1 % ξ32 p2 )
Hence, the independent supply shock leads to an updating rule which is again standard 
.E i(Q |H i3 )'
E i(Q|H i2 ) (α%β%µ21γ1%µ22γ2) % 1
κ3µ3
(p3&κ3λ3y&κ3ξ31p1&κ3ξ32p2 )(µ
2
3γ3 )
α % β % µ21γ1 % µ
2
2γ2 % µ
2
3γ3
Simplification and averaging over the population leads to the market forecast
¯E2 ( Q) '
[α & µ1γ1λ1 & µ2γ2λ2 & µ3γ3λ3]y % βQ
α % β % µ21γ1 % µ
2
2γ2
%
.%
µ1γ1
κ1
p1%
µ2γ2
κ2
p2%
µ3γ3
κ3
p3&µ3γ3ξ31 p1&µ3γ3ξ32 p2&µ2γ2ξ21 p1
α % β % µ21γ1 % µ
2
2γ2
8As in (4b’)  individual and market forecasts can be expressed in terms of the unobserved variables.
They can easily be extended to N rounds of trade and take the general form
(6) E i(Q |H iN ) '
αy% βx i%
j
N
j'1
µ2j γjQ
α % β %
j
N
j'1
µ2j γj
&
j
N
j'1
µjγjSj
α % β %
j
N
j'1
µ2j γj
A standard argument shows the  converge. For simplicity assume the precision of  Sj is constantµj
hence  = γ. The independence property of the noise with (6) and the law of large numbers imply thatγj
the first term converges to Q and the second converge with probability 1 to 0. Hence, in the limit, with
probability 1 all forecasts converge to the true  Q and the effect of the public signal y disappears.
Hence, repeated trade leads to a full revelation of the true value Q. Moreover, in the limit  p = Q and
traders do not forecast prices at all. If the unit of time is, say, a month the rounds of trade are not
really limited. Hence the result contradicts Allen, Morris and Shin’s (2003) claim that the effect of the
public signal  y on the price lingers on forever. With sufficient trading the effect of  y  disappears.
To conclude, the study of markets with private information has advanced our understanding of
risk sharing and insurance markets. Here we examine its limits. With different information agents
clearly make different forecasts. But private information is a very sharp sword. Hence, when diverse
forecasting is an important component of a theory, the temptation is to assume private information to
model diversity. A large literature has done just that. It is so common that for some, thinking of agents
with different opinions is synonymous to thinking of them as having different private information. For
forecasting market aggregates this equivalence is wrong and the assumption of private information has
no merit. We identify three areas of forecasting where the model of diverse beliefs is the correct one:
(i)   Market prices such as interest rates, indices of stock prices, foreign exchange rates ;
(ii)  Macroeconomic variables such as rates of GNP growth, inflation, unemployment,
monetary policy actions;
(iii) Exogenous shocks like productivity shocks, aggregate factor supplies etc.
Unfortunately there are many contributions which use models with asymmetric private information to
solve problems in which traders forecast variables in the above three categories. Examples include
Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1972) but recent examples include Romer and Romer (2000), Hellwig
(2002), Woodford (2003), Amato and Shin (2003) Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005a) and others.
4
 To illustrate, Kurz (1997b) explains the volatility of foreign exchange rates and the forward discount bias in foreign
exchange markets by demonstrating that these are consequences of diverse beliefs of traders about future exchange rates. In
rejecting the REE framework he assumes agents hold diverse Rational Beliefs which are restricted as explained in Section 3.5
below. In such a market the center of uncertainty is the uncertainty of traders about future beliefs of other traders. Bacchetta
and van Wincoop (2005a) adopt the same idea by using a noisy REE but assume that at each date traders have random private
information about future aggregate money supply. Hence traders are uncertain about future private information of other
traders. Our argument here is that in the context of exchange rates determination such an assumption does not have empirical
validity and hence leads to an implausible explanation of the forward discount bias.
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Our view is then that the economic explanation provided by these papers is flawed and questionable4. 
To compare with theories under diverse beliefs, we interpret the asset value Q in the Noisy
REE literature to be an aggregate value such as the S&P500, an interest rate or an exchange rate.
Before formulating our HB model, we observe that the simple model discussed above leads to several
natural objections against models where traders use private information to forecast variables in the
three categories listed above. These natural objections do not depend upon the formulation of any
specific heterogenous belief model. For this reason we outline these first.
2. When Should the Assumption of Asymmetric Information Be Avoided?
In casting significant doubt on the validity of the PI assumption we recall that the typical
problem studied with PI include market volatility, aggregate risk premia, foreign exchange dynamics,
business cycles, the effects of monetary policy, etc. Apart from the fact that the assumption of private
information is not plausible, we also argue that the explanations offered for these phenomena, driven
by Private Information, are unconvincing. Thus, PI offers a distorted “solution” for such problems. 
(i)  What is the data that constitutes “private” information?  If forecasters of GNP growth or future
interest rates use PI, one must be able to specify the data to which such forecasters have an exclusive
access. Forecasters of macroeconomic variables, including the Federal Reserve itself, state their data
sources and universally claim they use only published data. More important, without an explicit
identification of the private information used by a forecaster, a model with PI does not make sense.
Indeed, all empirical implications the model has are deduced from restrictions imposed by that
information. As illustrated in Section 1, a model with PI specifies an unknown parameter Q  about
which agents receive private signals  with   For this to have meaning one must knowx it i ' 1, 2, . . .
what the  are or what they could conceivably be. When agents forecast aggregate variables in thex it
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three categories above, no such imaginary data exist. 
(ii)  Asymmetric information imply a Secretive Economy. Forecasters take pride in their models and
are eager to make their forecasts public. As a result, there are vast data files on market forecasts of
most of the variables mentioned. These include data of the Blue Chip Economic Indicators (BLU),
Blue Chip Financial Forecasts (BLUF), the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), forecasts by
individual firms engaged in forecasting and even detailed forecast data of the staff of the Federal
Reserve System. Such data are being used more and more in economic research as (e.g. Romer and
Romer (2000), Swanson (2006), Kurz (2005), Kurz and Motolese (2005) ). In addition to making
public their forecast data, forecasters stress their opinions are different from others. In discussing
public information they explain their own interpretation of such information often framed as “their
thesis”, the weight they place on it and their disagreement with others’ use of that same information.
Trade journals are used to debate forecasting techniques and in public competitions prizes are awarded
to the best forecaster in specified categories. Since PI gives clear advantage to those who have it other
forecasters would not compete since there is nothing to compete about. In short, forecasters view their
work as model formulation and interpretation of information, not a reflection of secret information to
which they are privy. Such behavior is not compatible with an equilibrium with PI.
In contrast, an equilibrium with PI is secretive. Individuals are careful not to divulge their PI
since it would deprive them of the advantage they have. In such an equilibrium all private forecast data
of any state variable (e.g. productivity) are treated as sources of new information. Agents use forecast
data of other forecasters to update their posterior beliefs about that state variable. Had such PI been
deduced from forecasts, the mean market forecast would change. Since in reality all forecasters happily
reveal their forecasts, the economy must converge to an equilibrium with uniform information. The
eagerness of agents to reveal their forecasts is thus not compatible with PI being the cause of the
persistent divergence of opinions and forecasts.
(iii) For the problems considered, asymmetric information is not sufficient.  Implicit in (ii) is the fact
that in REE with PI, there is basic tension between information asymmetry and revelation\learning. If
prices reveal PI the model has noise to prevent such revelation. Noise must be unobserved and the
11
cause for the noise is often unspecified. When specified, it takes strange forms such as an unobserved
random supply of the asset. But then, the implications of the theory do not depend only upon the
private information available but, more important, on the investigator’s noise. The problem does not
end there. As we have seen, repeated trading overcomes the effect of noise and leads to full revelation.
Since the number of rounds of trade is a model construct, the empirical implications of the model are
affected by an artificial component constructed in the model. Finally, there are other channels that
affect the revelation of PI. For example, private forecast data is available and is extensively used
(otherwise the data would not be collected). Given the assumption of PI, much information could then
be deduced from private forecasts. Hence, any implications of theories based on PI cannot depend only
upon prices; they must also depend upon other channels for inference. Without credible and observable
ways to measure these channels of revelation the theory lacks empirical implications. Also, there are
other formulations of the private information model in real time (e.g. Judd and Bernardo (1996), 
(2000), Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005a), Wang (1994)) but we do not review them here.
(iv) If private signals are unobserved, how could common knowledge of the structure be attained? To
permit a deduction of PI from public data the structure of the private signals must be common
knowledge. For example, they may take the form  where  are pure noise, independentx i ' Q % εi εi
across traders. But then one asks the simpler question: if these signals are not publically observed, how
does the common knowledge come about? How does agent i know that his own signal takes the form
 and that  is an unbiased estimate of  θ? How does trader  i  knows that the signal of  k x i ' Q % εi x i
takes the form ? Are these not merely devices used by the investigator to enable a closedx k ' Q % εk
form solution of the Bayesian inference problem, rather than an empirically verifiable hypothesis?
(v)  Why are private signals more informative than audited public signals?  One peculiar assumption
that drives the results of Morris and Shin (2002), Allen, Morris and Shin (2003), Bacchetta and van
Wincoop (2005a) and others, is explained in the model of Section 1. It says that traders get a public
signal  y  which is the mean value of the unknown Q. Knowing the prior mean of  Q  is clearly inferior
to knowing the true Q. It is then assumed there is a continuum of agents on [0 , 1] with x i ' Q%εi
and with   i.i.d.  Hence,  if you knew all private signals you would use the law of large numbers toεi
aggregate them and learn the true Q. In an REE it is assumed there is some agent who aggregates the
12
information and hence equilibrium price becomes a function of the true Q,  which nobody knows.  But
this procedure raises two questions. 
(a) Why do private signals contain more precise information than the professionally audited
statements? Does it make sense to postulate that audited statements are less reliable than the sum of all
the fragmentary signals that individuals obtain? 
(b) Who is doing the aggregation? How does he know the i.i.d. structure needed to arrive at an
aggregation? What are the incentives of this aggregating agent? If he is a neutral agent with a duty not
to exploit the public, why does he not simply announce Q? Or else, he must be part of the model.
(vi)  With asymmetric information you can prove anything. A typical model with PI is based on the
fact that crucial components of the theory can never be observable. We shall never observe the private
signals agents had about GNP growth or about future value of the S&P500. This lack of observability
is contrasted with the case of insurance markets where driving records or health records can confirm
the assumption that agents have PI which, ex ante, is not available to firms in the insurance market.
But if there is no way to ever obtain data on the crucial component of the theory, the theory cannot be
falsified: for any hypothesis about market behavior one can find a pattern of PI that would induce that
behavior as an equilibrium behavior. The theory has no empirical restrictions and without restrictions it
has no scientific content. 
3.  Modeling Asset Pricing Under HB with Public Information Only
We now turn to the alternative paradigm of HB instead of private information. What are the
differences between these two theories and do these differences matter?
3.1 Adaptation of the Earlier Model
To adapt the model of Section 1 with PI to a market with HB and only public information, we
clearly reject the common knowledge assumptions made. But then what is common knowledge among
traders with diverse beliefs? Our unequivocal answer is past data on observable variables. Traders
know they all observe the same data. They have diverse beliefs about the future because they have
diverse interpretations of past data. Hence, a mechanical adaptation of the two- period economy in
Section 1 is not suitable for an economy with HB. A meaningful model with HB must be anchored in
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real time with past data available at each date. To permit a comparison we thus adapt the earlier model
by preserving its key assumptions. Apart from private information, the key assumptions are: (i) traders
live finite life and derive utility from the terminal value of their net wealth; (ii) at date 1 agents cannot
trade futures contracts for delivery of the stock at date 2;  (iii) at date 1 traders must form beliefs
about the price at date 2 and the true liquidation value . This changed notation will be clarified later.ˆQ
Our adaptation is then based on two principles. First, we maintain the above assumptions.
Second, we require that our model generates exactly the same demand functions as the PI model in
(2a) -(2b) so the comparison is reduced to differences between the implied probabilities used. Since
under HB traders need price history to form beliefs, we assume trading is carried out by generations of
traders, each of whom trades for two periods. In our setting a trader who starts trading at date t trades
again at date t +1 and retires at the end of t+1, after  is revealed and the value of his holdings isˆQt%1
set. At retirement he exchanges his stock for consumption goods. Hence, at each t there are two types
of overlapping traders: one group whose trading career is launched at t-1 and who retire at the end of
trading at t, and a second group launched at date t, and who retires at t+1. Our economy consists of a
continuum of traders of each type. As was the case in the PI model, we do not explicitly model the
entire economy with consumption, investment, and production. The real economy is the background
and the model is used to study the behavior of risk taking investors who use financial markets to trade
risk. As in the PI model we assume their utility is defined only over gains from trading risk hence
comparison of asset returns is a comparison of risk premia in an economy under PI vs risk premia
under HB. With a real economy in the background we follow the PI literature and assume a constant
riskless interest rate and without loss of generality let it be zero. The traded stock reflects an aggregate
collection of assets kept in the background about which true audited information is revealed at the end
of each date. These valuations are then used to compensate the retiring traders for risk taking. 
 is the value revealed at date t and the long history of   for k = 1, 2, ..., t  is known atˆQt ˆQk
date t hence traders use past data to compute the finite dimensional distributions of the observations.
Clearly, all compute the same empirical moments. Using standard extension of measures they all
deduce from the data a unique probability measure on infinite sequences denoted by  m. It can be
shown that  m  is stationary (see Kurz (1994)) and we call it “the stationary measure.” This is the
empirical knowledge shared by all. To conform to the earlier model assume the data reveals the  areˆQt
5
 It would probably be more realistic to assume that the values Qt  grow and the growth rate of the values has a mean
µ rather than the values themselves. This added realism is useful when we motivate the model later but is not essential for the
analytic development.
6
 Without altering any of our results we could initiate trading with an endowment of a real commodity as in ordinary
overlapping generation models. This is a consequence of the fact that under the utility function in (7) there are no income
effects. Had we included such endowment, the definition of wealth would simply include it.
7
 Model consistency clearly requires the sum of shares surrendered by date t-1 retiring traders to equal the sum of
shares allotted to new traders at date t. This assumption is inconsequential since young traders take the share allotment as
exogenous and with free borrowing and without wealth effects the rule for initial shares allotment has no effect on optimal
portfolios. An alternative procedure would be to treat the initial endowment as a loan in the form of shares borrowed. This
would then lead to the requirement that the trader must return the loan and the amount  would be subtracted fromS it (Qt%1%µ)
terminal wealth.  
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conditionally normally distributed with mean µ and precision 5.  Now define . A theory of
α Qt ' ˆQt & µ
belief diversity flows from the fact that traders do not know the true probability distribution of the
‘s. That is, the stochastic process { } has an unknown probability Π. Traders knowQt Qt , t ' 1 ,2 , . . .
only the stationary probability m deduced from data. The distinction between  m  and  Π  is central to
our development and is explored later when we describe the belief structure. Here we note traders’
beliefs at date t are conditioned on common information which consists of past values of  for k =Ht Qk
1, 2, ..., t  and prices. As in the PI model, trader i  is launched at t (he is “date t” trader) with an
endowment of shares but the total supply is a constant, not random.  Our notation is:S it
  - the endowment of shares with which trader i is launched at date t;S it
- date t demand of trader  i who is launched at date t;D i1t
- date t+1 demand of trader  i who is launched at date t;D i2t%1
S - total constant supply of shares.
Traders borrow or hold cash at the riskless rate hence they trade between the aggregate asset and
cash. Under the utility function in (7) the assumption of an endowment of shares is a convenientS it
assumption with absolutely no effect on the results.6 With endowment and borrowing a trader
purchases his initial stock position at the cost of . At t+1 he traders again into the positionD i1t D
i1
t pt
. At the end of date t+1 the audited valuation of the asset  is revealed. Given the traderD i2t%1 Qt%1 Qt%1
exchanges his stock position for real commodities and retires. The shares of retiring traders areD i2t%1
then used for the initial endowment to the next generation of traders7. A trader has a preference over
risky capital gains. His net terminal wealth is and hisW it%1'S
i
t pt%D
i1
t ( pt%1&pt)%D i2t%1( Qt%1%µ&pt%1 )
date t+1 utility is 
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(7)  .u(W it%1 ) ' & e
&( W
i
t%1
τ
)
, W it%1'S
i
t pt%D
i1
t (pt%1&pt)%D
i2
t%1( Qt%1%µ&pt%1 )
(7) shows that on the demand  trader i makes gains or losses of  while gains on D i1t D i1t ( pt%1&pt) D i2t%1
are . The realized  has informational value to a date t trader since it is a signalD i2t%1(Qt%1%µ &pt%1 ) Qt
for . Apart from this, it has no impact on his wealth since  is payment to retiring portfolios at t.Qt%1 Qt
In short, with a real economy in the background agents in our model redistribute risk in accord with
their beliefs or information. This is exactly the spirit of the PI model.
Trader i who is launched at date t selects an optimal trading strategy which sequentially solves
(7a)    J i2t%1 (D i1t ) ' Max
D i2t%1
E i &exp[& 1
τ
( S it pt % D
i1
t (pt%1&pt)%D
i2
t%1( Qt%1%µ&pt%1 )] | Ht%1
(7b) J i1t 'Max
D i1t
E i Max
D i2t%1
E i &exp[& 1
τ
(S it pt%D
i1
t ( pt%1&pt )%D
i2
t%1(Qt%1%µ&pt%1)] |Ht%1 |Ht .
(7a) solves for , given date 1 demand function, while (7b) solves for i’s demand in date 1. TheD i2t
reasoning presented earlier for computing the demand functions applies here as well. They are
(8a)       .D i2t%1(pt%1) '
τ
Var i (Qt%1 |Ht%1)
[E i(Qt%1 |Ht%1) % µ & pt%1 ]
(8b)       .D i1t ( pt ) '
τ
G1
[E i(pt%1 | Ht) & pt] %
(G2 & G1 )
G1
[E i( D i2t%1 | Ht )]
Is our adaptation of the model reasonable? Since our trader lives for two periods (he is “long
lived”) we incorporate the hedging demand. But, as required, our demand functions are identically the
same as in the model with PI: (8a)-(8b) and (2a)-(2b) are exactly the same functions. The crucial
difference between the private information and the heterogenous belief models are the expectations of
traders in (8a)-(8b) and (2a)-(2b) and the information they are assumed to have. We also observe that,
although somewhat artificial, the assumption of a share endowment to new traders removes allS it
intergenerational effects of a trader’s decision. Indeed, the equality of the demand functions together
with the device of the share endowment attains model consistency and ensures that the infinite time
horizon in our model has no independent effect. That is, the facts that the first model is of a finite
horizon economy and the second is imbedded in an infinite horizon economy do not lead, on their
own, to different implications of the two models. 
The infinite repetition introduces the driving force of diverse beliefs which is the fact that Π,
the true probability of the process { }, is unknown. The model is given an economicQt , t ' 1 ,2 , . . .
8
 The model could be modified to the more famialr form where { } are the usual risky dividends. InQt , t ' 1,2 , . . .
that case date t trader buy assets  at date t and  at date t+1. He receives dividends  and  for investmentsD i1t D
i2
t%1 Qt%1%µ Qt%2%µ
made at  dates t and t+1 respectively. Dividend payments are paid, as usual, at the start of a period and are known at the time
of trading. As a result, date t trader retires at the start of date t +2 and when he liquidates his position by selling it into the
market for the value of . Uncertainty about is now theW it%2'D
i1
t (pt%1%Qt%1%µ &pt )%D i2t%1(pt%2%Qt%2%µ &pt%1) (Qt%1 , Qt%2)
uncertainty about profits. Computing the implied demand functions we find that they are slightly different from (2a)-(2b). We
elected to stay with the problem (7a)-(7b) and demand functions (8a)-(8b), which offer an entirely reasonable analytical
platform with which to carry out the comparison we seek. 
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interpretation via a collection of real assets, kept in the background. These experience changes in
innovation and organization so the time variability of the mean values of { } is driven byQt , t ' 1 ,2 , . . .
the forces of change. The terminal wealth of trader  i, who is initiated at date t, depends upon . IfQt%1
he does not trade, his terminal net wealth is .  But then, what does theW it%1 ' S
i
t (Qt%1 % µ )
liquidation value reflect? It is clear this value is a compensation for taking risk associated with net
profits of the background assets and results from the fact that date t uncertainty is resolved only after
date t trading. Risk taking of this sort takes place in diverse sectors such as agriculture, mining, oil
extraction, real estate and others. In these arrangement an investor buys an equity position which is
tradable. The capital in the venture typically consists of the cumulative net output of the venture. In
agriculture it may be the grain produced at the risky harvest, in oil extraction it may be oil discoveries,
in mining it may be minerals discovered, in venture capital it is the realized valuation at the public
offering. Thus, ownership shares allow risk sharing of the prospects involved and liquidation by the
retiring members is permitted when the outcome of date t venture is known (i.e. size of crops, amount
of oil found, outcome of a venture capital project, etc.). More generally, the market price reflects the
valuation of the risky prospect while the liquidation value is the known benefit of the venture when it
matures. When trading is resumed at date t+1 the venture continues into its next phase with new
activity, new members and a new true value that will become known after trading. This, of course, is
the assumption made in the PI model and since we want the demand functions of the two models to be
identically the same, we must adopt this same concept as well.8
In the next section we model the structure of traders’ beliefs, which is central to this paper. We
have stressed that disagreements arise from diverse interpretation of the same empirical record. Thus,
to conclude this section we make the simple assumption that the empirical frequencies of recorded past
values is known by all to imply a first order Markov process described by a stationary transition
(9)  .Qt ' λQ Qt&1 % ρQt , ρQt - N(0 , σ2Q )
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Since the implied stationary probability is denoted by  m, we write .E m[Qt |Qt&1] ' λQ Qt&1
Is the stationary model  (9) with probability  m  the true data generating mechanism and hence
is it the case that m = Π? If the environment was stationary and if all traders knew it was stationary,
the Ergodic Theorem says that all would know the true data generating process. Indeed, in that case it
would be common knowledge that (9) is the truth. In reality such conditions do not hold. The
economy undergoes rapid changes with structural breaks associated with periods of high or low
productivity. The process { } is then non-stationary under the true probability Π whichQt , t ' 1 ,2 , . . .
is not known to anyone. A stationary Markov empirical record is simply an average over different
regimes. In particular, the first order Markov property is a result of diverse dynamic patterns, averaged
out statistically over time. The simple analogy we can give for the empirical frequencies of past values
is like running a single regression over a long data set with many unobserved regimes. Such a
procedure estimates the average over different structures. But, for long data sets, this is all that they
could ever agree on. The fact is that  traders do not believe the empirical distribution of the past is
adequate to forecast the future. All surveys of forecasters show that subjective judgment contributes
more than 50% to the final forecast (e.g. Batchelor and Dua (1991)). In this environment each trader
forms his own beliefs about Qt and other state variables to be explored in the next section. With such
complexity how do we describe an equilibrium? For such a description do we really need to give a full,
detailed, development of all the diverse theories of the traders?
3.2 Heterogeneity of belief: The Question is How!
Diverse beliefs is the result of the fact that agents do not know the exact structure of a
complex economy. Since one cannot be declared irrational if one cannot hold Rational Expectations,
the concept of rationality must be modified. The theory of Rational Beliefs (in short, RB due to Kurz
(1994), (1997a)) defines a trader to be rational if his model cannot be falsified by the data and if
simulated, it reproduces the empirical distribution. Under this theory rational traders may hold diverse
forecasting models based on different interpretations of the data. More generally, without a compelling
known “true” model, any meaningful concept of rationality of belief will embrace a wide collection of
models. Such a conclusion raises a clear methodological question. In formulating an asset pricing
theory should we provide a detailed description and motivate the subjective models of each trader in
the model?  With diversity of traders such a task is formidable. But if the objective is an understanding
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of the dynamics of asset prices, is such a detailed description necessary? An examination of the subject
reveals that, although an intriguing question, such a detailed task is not needed. Instead, to describe an
equilibrium all that we need is to specify how the beliefs of the traders affect their subjectively
perceived transition functions of all the state variables. Once these are specified, the Euler equations
are fully specified and market clearing leads to equilibrium pricing. To carry out such a program we
follow the structure developed in Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2005a), (2005b).  We now outline this
development for traders in our simple asset price model.
3.3 Market Belief as a State Variable: Diverse Opinions vs. Asymmetric Information
In markets without private information agents are willing to reveal their forecasts. Hence, in
formulating our theory we now assume that market forecast data are public. The crucial difference
between markets with and without private information is that when individual forecasts of a state
variable are revealed in a market without private information, others do not see such forecasts as a
source of new data and do not update their own beliefs about a parameter used to forecast that state
variable. In such a market, a forecaster uses knowledge about the forecasts of others to alter his
forecasts of endogenous variables since these depend upon the market belief. In short, the difference
between an equilibrium with PI and an equilibrium without PI but with HB is that in the latter agents
do not learn from others and do not update their beliefs about state variables based on the opinions
of others. But then, how do we describe the individual and market beliefs?
The key analytical step we have taken (see Kurz (1994), Kurz (1997a), Kurz and Motolese
(2001), Kurz, Jin and Motolese (2005a),(2005b)) is to treat individual beliefs as personal state
variables, generated within the economy. That is, an individual belief about an economy’s state variable
are described with a personal state of belief which uniquely pins down the conditional probability or
transition function of next period’s economy’s state variable. Hence, personal states of belief are
analogous to other state variables in the decision problem of the agent, although iy can also be
interpreted as defining the more familiar concept of a “type” of the trader. At date t the trader is not
certain of his future belief type but his behavior (e.g. Bayesian updating) or procedural model and
interpretation of current information determines the dynamics of the personal state of belief. The
distribution of individual states of belief then becomes a central economy-wide dynamical force where
the cross sectional average state of belief is simply the average of individual beliefs. As we indicated,
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the crucial fact is that the distribution of beliefs in the market is observable. In equilibrium, endogenous
variables (e.g. prices) depend upon the economy’s state variables, but in a large economy a trader’s
“anonymity” implies a personal state of belief has a negligible effect on prices. It turns out that with
the utility function we use equilibrium endogenous variables depend only upon the distribution of
market beliefs. Thus, as in any equilibrium, prices and other endogenous variables are functions of the
economy’s state variables and here these state variables include the distribution of personal beliefs. In
our equilibrium the moments of the cross sectional distributions of belief are important economy state
variables and their stochastic transition laws play a central role. Finally, since endogenous variables are
functions of the market beliefs, it follows that future endogenous variables are forecasted by
forecasting the market distribution of beliefs using the known equilibrium map. In short, to forecast
future endogenous variables a trader must forecast the beliefs of others.
 We thus introduce trader i’s state of belief  . It describes his perception by pinning down hisg it
transition functions. Adding to “anonymity” we assume trader i knows his own  and the marketg it
distribution of  across k. As to past, he observes past distributions of the  for all τ < t hence heg kt g
k
τ
knows past values of the moments of the distributions of the . We specify the dynamics of  by   g k
τ
g it
(10) g it ' λZg it&1 % ρigt , ρigt - N( 0 , σ2g )
where   are correlated across  i  reflecting correlation of beliefs across individuals. The concept ofρigt
an individual state of belief, with dynamics (10), is central to our development. Here we state (10) as a
positive description of type heterogeneity but in Section 3.5 we prove (10) as a consequence of a
Bayesian updating procedure. We postpone this demonstration in order to explain first the asset
pricing theory implied by our model of HB. We note that in general   is used to express a trader’sg it
assessment of the difference between date t distribution of an observable state variable and the
empirical distribution  m. In the model of this paper the perception of trader i regarding  at date tQt
(denoted by ) is described by using the belief state  as followsQ it g it
(11a)  .Q it ' λQQt&1 % λgQ g it % ρiQt , ρiQt - N(0 , σˆ2Q )
The assumption that  is the same for all traders is made for simplicity. It follows that the state ofσˆ2Q
belief   measures the deviation of his forecast from the empirical stationary forecastg it
 (11b)  .E i [Q it |Ht , g it ] & E m[ Qt |Ht ]' λgQg it
Indeed, (11b) shows how to measure  in practice. For any state variable Xt,  data on i’s forecasts ofg it
Xt  (in (11b) it is Qt ) are measured by . One then uses standard econometric techniquesE i [X it |Ht , g it ]
9
 Keep in mind the unnatural timing in the model. At date t trader i has a state of belief  about variables he doesg it
not know. These are: (i) Qt to be announced at the end of date t, and (ii) Zt+1 to be revealed at the start of t+1. This peculiar
timing is a consequence of the timing in the private information model presented in the Introduction according to which  Qt  is
revealed at the end of date t. Also, for simplicity we assume (14a)-(14b) is the same across traders: diversity is in the .g it
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to construct the stationary forecast  with which one empirically constructs the differenceE m [Xt |Ht ]
in (11b). This construction and the data it makes available are at the core of the papers by Fan (2005)
and Kurz and Motolese (2005). A trader type who believes the empirical distribution is the truth, is
described by , hence he believes that  . Since belief heterogeneity is theg it ' 0 Qt - N(λQ Qt&1 , σ2Q )
result of dynamic non-stationarity of the economy, it should be clear that around 1900 the subjective
assessments of the   were related to the development of electricity and the combustion engine, whileg it
around 2000 the belief measured the impact of computers and information technology. Hence,g it
success or failures of past   do not really tell you anything what present day  should be. Thisg i
τ
g it
issue is further explored in Section 3.5 and for additional details see Kurz (1997a).
Denote by  the first moment of the cross sectional distribution of the  and we refer to it asZt g
i
t
“the average state of belief.” It is observable.  Due to correlation across traders, the law of large
numbers is not operative and the average of   over i does not vanish. We write it in the form  ρigt
(12) .Zt%1 ' λZ Zt % ρZt%1
The true distribution of   is unknown. Correlation across agents exhibits non stationarity and thisρZt%1
property is inherited by the { Zt , t = 1, 2, ...} process. Since Zt are observable, market participants
actually have data on the joint process  { }.  Traders are thus assumed to know(Qt , Zt%1 ) , t ' 1 ,2 , . . .
the joint empirical distribution of these variables. For simplicity we assume that this distribution is
described by the system of equations
(13a) Qt ' λQ Qt&1 % ρQt
    
ρ
Q
t
ρ
Z
t%1
- N
0
0
,
σ
2
Q, 0,
0, σ2Z
' Σ , i.i.d.
(13b) Zt%1 ' λZ Zt % ρZt%1
Now, a trader who does not believe that (13a)-(13b) is the truth for t, formulates his own model\belief.
We have seen in (11a) how trader i’s belief state  pins down his forecast of   . We now broadeng it Q it
this idea to the trader’s perception model of the two state variables . Keeping in mind that(Q it , Z it%1 )
before observing Qt trader i knows , his belief takes the general symmetric form9 Qt&1 and Zt
(14a) Q it ' λQQt&1 % λgQ g it % ρiQt ρiQt%1
ρ
iZ
t%1
- N
0
0
,
σˆ
2
Q, σˆZQ,
σˆZQ, σˆ
2
Z
' Σ
i
,
(14b)     Z it%1 ' λZ Zt % λgZg it % ρiZt%1
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Although the belief state  was initially defined to be about the unknown value , (14a)-(14b) showg it Qt
that we use it also to pin down the transition of . We could have, instead, introduced a newZ it%1
variable to express belief about future Z. We avoid this procedure for simplicity and in order tog iZt
avoid an artificial problem of infinite regress. Hence,   expresses how the agent considers theg it
present conditions to be different from the empirical distribution:
(14c)    E it
Qt
Zt%1
&E mt
Qt
Zt%1
'
λ
g
Qg
i
t
λ
g
Zg
i
t
The average market expectation operator is loosely defined by .  From (14c) it is¯Et (C ) '
m
E it ( C ) di
 (14d)   .    ¯Et
Qt
Zt%1
& E mt
Qt
Zt%1
'
λ
g
Q Zt
λ
g
Z Zt
The perception models (14a)-(14b) explains why the average individual market belief is not a proper
probability. To see this let  be a product space where  take their values and let GiX ' Q×Z (Qt&1 , Zt)
be the space of the  . Since  i  conditions on his own , his unconditional probability is a measureg it g
i
t
on the space where öi is i’s sigma field. Hence, the average market conditional( ( Q×Z×G i)4 ,öi )
belief is an average of conditional probabilities, each conditioning on a different state variable. Hence,
one cannot write down a probability space for the market belief and we have the following result:
Theorem 1: The average individual belief violates iterated expectations: .¯Et (Qt%1) … ¯Et ¯Et%1(Qt%1)
Proof: From (14a)-(14b) we know that
 .E it (Qt%1 ) ' λQE it ( Qt) % λgQ E it (g it%1) ' λQ [λQ Qt&1%λgQ g it ] % λgQλZg it
It follows that 
(15a) .¯Et (Qt%1 ) ' λ2QQt&1%λgQ (λQ % λZ) Zt
On the other hand (14a) implies 
¯Et%1 ( Qt%1 ) ' λQ Qt % λgQ Zt%1
hence 
E it ¯Et%1 ( Qt%1 ) ' λQ [λQ Qt&1 % λgQ g it ] % λgQ [λZ Zt % λgZg it ]
and aggregating now to conclude that
(15b) .¯Et ¯Et%1 (Qt%1) ' λ2Q Qt&1 % λgQ (λQ % λZ % λgZ ) Zt
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Comparison of (15a) and (15b) shows that . ¯Et (Qt%1 ) … ¯Et¯Et% (Qt%1 )
Belief and Information: Understanding what is . From the perspective of a trader,  is a stateZt Zt
variable like any other. News about  are used to forecast prices and assess the time variability ofZt
market risk premia in the same way macroeconomic data such as GNP growth or Non Farm Payroll
are used to assess the risk of a recession. Market belief may be wrong as it may forecast recessions
that never occur. Market risk premia may fall just because traders are more optimistic about the future,
not necessarily because there is any specific data which convinces everybody the future is bright. But
then, how do traders update their beliefs when they observe ? In sharp contrast with the PI theory,Zt
traders do not revise their own beliefs about the state variable ; (14) specifically does not dependQt
upon . Traders do consider  as new information about  since they know all used all availableZt Zt Qt
information. Without being a “signal” about unobserved private information,  is not used to updateZt
beliefs about exogenous variables. The importance of   is it’s great value in forecasting futureZt
endogenous variables. Date t endogenous variables depend upon  and  future endogenous variablesZt
depend upon future market belief. Since market belief exhibits persistence, traders know that today’s
market belief is useful for forecasting future endogenous variables. How is this equilibrated?  This is
what we show now.
3.4 Combining the Elements: the Implied Asset Pricing Theory Under Diverse Beliefs
We now derive equilibrium prices under HB. Denote the conditional variance of  Qt (common
to all traders) by . By (8a)-(8b) we write the date t demand functions of the two type of traders as σ2Q
(16a)        .D i2t ( pt) '
τ
σ
2
Q
[E i(Qt%µ |Ht) & pt ]
(16b)  .D i1t ( pt ) '
τ
G1
[E i(pt%1 | Ht) & pt] %
(G2 & G1 )
G1
[E i( D i2t%1 | Ht )]
For an equilibrium to exist we need some stability conditions. To specify these we introduce the
notation . Now we add:δ ' 1 & G2 / (G1%σ2Q)
Stability Conditions: We require that   . 0 < λQ < 1 , 0 < λZ % λ
g
Z < 1 , 0 < |δ | < 1
The first requires {Qt , t = 1, 2, ...}  to be stable and have an empirical distribution. The second is a
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stability of belief condition. It requires i to believe  is stable. To see why take expectations of(Qt&1 , Zt)
(14b), average over the population and recall  Zt  are market averages of the . This implies that g it
.
¯Et [Zt%1 ] ' (λZ % λgZ )Zt
Theorem 2: For the model with HB and under the specified stability conditions, there is a unique
equilibrium price function which takes the form 
.pt ' a(Qt&1 % µ ) % bZt & cS
Proof: Aggregating (16a) over all retiring traders and (16b) over all new traders at date t leads to
(17a)        .¯D 2t (pt) '
τ
σ
2
Q
[ ¯Et(Qt%µ ) & pt]
(17b) .¯D 1t (pt ) '
τ
G1
[ ¯Et( pt%1 % Qt % µ ) & pt] %
( G2 & G1 )
G1
τ
σ
2
Q
[ ¯Et(Qt%1%µ ) & ¯Etpt%1 ] ]
Since   we add (17a)-(17b) to conclude that¯D 2t (pt) % ¯D
1
t ( pt) ' S
   .S ' τ
σ
2
Q
[ ¯Et( Qt % µ ) & pt ] %
τ
G1
[ ¯Et(pt%1 % Qt % µ ) & pt ] %
(G2 & G1 )
G1
τ
σ
2
Q
[ ¯Et( Qt%1%µ ) & ¯Et[pt%1] ]
Hence
       .S ' ( τ
σ
2
Q
%
τ
G1
)[¯Et(Qt%µ )&pt]% (
τ
G1
)[1& ( G2&G1 )
σ
2
Q
] ¯Et( pt%1)%
(G2&G1 )
G1
τ
σ
2
Q
[ ¯Et( Qt%1%µ )]]
Now use the perception models (14a)-(14b) about the state variables, average them over the
population and use the definition of  Zt  to deduce the following relationships which are the key
implications of treating individual and market beliefs as state variables
(18a) ¯Et(Qt ) ' λQQt&1 % λgQ Zt
(18b) ¯Et( Qt%1 ) ' (λQ)2 Qt&1 % [λQλgQ % λgQ λZ ]Zt
(18c) .¯Et(Zt%1 ) ' (λZ % λgZ ) Zt
Now solve for date t price to deduce
(19)  .pt ' ¯Et (Qt % µ ) %
(G2&G1 )
G1 % σ
2
Q
¯Et ( Qt%1%µ ) %
σ
2
Q%G1&G2
G1 % σ
2
Q
¯Et (pt%1) &
σ
2
Q G1
G1 % σ
2
Q
[ S
τ
]
Observe that (18a)-(18c) together with (19) imply that equilibrium price is the solution of the
following difference equation 
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(20)  pt ' A(Qt&1 % µ ) % BZt % δ ¯Et [pt%1 ] & CS , δ '
σ
2
Q%G1&G2
G1%σ
2
Qwith
    ,    ,   .A ' λQ %
(G2&G1 )
G1 % σ
2
Q
λ
2
Q B ' λ
g
Q %
(G2&G1 )
G1 % σ
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Q % λ
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τ
) σ
2
QG1
G1 % σ
2
Q
(20) is a linear difference equation in the two state variables  . Hence,  a standard argument(Qt&1 , Zt)
(see Blanchard and Kahn(1980), Proposition, page 1308) shows that the solution is 
 (21a) pt ' C1 (Qt&1 % µ ) % C2 Zt & C3 S
with matching coefficients of 
 (21b) C1 ' [
1
1 & δλQ
] (G2&G1 )
G1 % σ
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Q
λ
2
Q
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Q
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Q % λ
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δλ
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Q
1 & δλQ
) (G2&G1 )
G1 % σ
2
Q
λ
2
Q
 (21d) .C3 ' (
1
1 & δ
) σ
2
QG1
τ (G1 % σ
2
Q )
The stability conditions ensure that  (21a) -  (21d) is the unique solution as asserted. 
Finally, recall that the demand functions (8a)-(8b) were computed under the conjecture that prices are
conditionally normally distributed. Theorem 2 provides the final confirmation of this conjectures. 
3.5 Deducing the Markov Belief Process  from Bayesian Inferenceg it ' λZg
i
t&1 % ρ
ig
t
Our key analytical tool is the state of belief and we now justify the dynamics (10). Keeping in
mind that we study asset pricing in a changing environment, our first justification is simplicity and
analytic tractability as seen in the developments in Sections 3.1 - 3.4. In a changing environment there
is no universal procedures to learn an unknown sequence of parameters. It is thus less important to
explain why agents disagree and more important to be able to describe their diversity so that an
equilibrium analysis is tractable. The description (10) of a state of belief in the form g it%1 ' λZg it % ρigt%1
where  leads to a simple and useful description of equilibrium asset pricing withρigt%1 - N(0 , σ2g )
10
 Keep in mind the timing: we observe  at the end of date t. To write a simple transition we assume   dependsQt Qt
upon the parameter bt. 
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diverse beliefs. It also shows that in contrast with PI theories, it does not entail extraction of
information from market prices. Instead, it requires different agents to have different state spaces for
description of their uncertainty. It also requires the endogenous expansion of the economy’s state
space for a description of equilibrium pricing. We next prove that the Markov dynamics (10) is a
consequence of elementary principles of Bayesian inference. 
 In a standard environment of Bayesian learning an agent faces data generated under an
unknown fixed parameter. The agent starts with a prior on the parameter and then uses Bayesian
inference for retrospective updating of his belief. The term “retrospective” stresses that inference is
made after the data had been generated. In real time the prior is also used to forecast the variable
observed since learning can only improve future forecasts of that variable. Our model economy is
dynamically changing with some parameters fixed and others that change over time. The fixed
parameters are known since they are deduced from the empirical frequencies. The time varying
parameters, reflecting the non stationarity of the economy, are modeled by the fact that under the true
probability Π the value  has a transition function of the form10 .  TheQt Qt & λQQt&1 ' bt % k
Q
t
sequence of parameters  is an exogenous, time varying mean value function. Traders know butbt λQ
not the sequence bt. This formulation includes economies with slow changing regimes, each lasting a
long time. Regimes may change rapidly or slowly but the mere fact that they change limits the validity
of Bayesian updating. To understand this limitation observe that at date  t a trader has a prior belief
about bt with which he forecasts . After observing  he updates his prior to have a sharperQt Qt
posterior estimate of  bt. But when date t+1 arrives he needs to forecast and for that he needs aQt%1
prior on bt+1. Traders do not know if and when a parameter changes. If the  bt  change slowly a sharp
posterior estimate of  bt (given ) may serve also as a prior belief about  bt+1. Indeed, if the agentQt
knew that  the updated posterior of  bt is the best prior of  bt+1. In the absence of suchbt ' bt%1
knowledge, agents would believe that  is one possibility. They would, however, seek anybt ' bt%1
additional information or use other subjective interpretation of public data to arrive at alternative
subjective estimates of to supplement the Bayesian procedure. Such subjective interpretation ofbt%1
public data arises naturally from the fact that public quantitative data is always provided together with
a vast amount of qualitative information which is the basis of all subjective interpretation of data. 
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3.5.1 Qualitative Information and Subjective Interpretation of Public Information
As noted, Bayesian inference is only possible with quantitative measures of the random
variables involved. The fact is that quantitative public data like  are always accompanied with vastQt
qualitative  information about usual or unusual market conditions. Examples will illustrate the point.
Data on inflation are interpreted in the context of reports evaluating abnormal productivity features,
conditions of the labor markets, assessment of the international price of energy, political environment,
etc. If   are profits of a specific firm then  is just one number extracted from a detailed financialQt Qt
report of the firm and multitude of reports about the industry, the technology or the products involved.
If  are profits of the S&P500 then qualitative information includes general business conditions,Qt
monetary policy, political environment, prospective tax reform, trade relations with the rest of the
world, trends in productivity growth and other macroeconomic conditions. It is often the case that
qualitative information cannot be compared over time and does not constitute conventional“data.” For
example, when a firm announces a new research into something that did not exist before, no past data
is available for comparison. When a new product changes the nature of an industry, it is a unique
event.  The fact is that financial markets pay a great deal of attention to qualitative announcements
which are often the focus of diverse opinions of forecasting investors.
There is little formal modeling of deduction from qualitative information. Saari (2006) uses
qualitative information in the context of a dynamical model of market shares. The model traces out the
equilibrium dynamics of each firm’s market share where qualitative information is represented by the
derivative of a firm’s response function at specified points. Such derivatives at isolated points in the
space provide a rational player an indication of possible future dynamical evolutions which are
consistent with the given derivatives. For an additional application see Toukan (2006). 
Here we adopt a very simple formalization of the use of  qualitative information. Elsewhere we
shall introduce a more formal development of these ideas.  Thus, to simplify we consider all qualitative
information as statements about the future. A statement may turn out to be true of false. Denote date t
statements by . The list changes over time hence  varies with t. These may offer(Ct1 , Ct2 , . . . , CtKt ) Kt
contradictory perspectives in the sense that if, for example, Ct1 materializes it would imply bright
prospects for while  Ct2  may lead to a negative assessment of . A realization at t+1 is aQt%1 Qt%1
vector of numbers which are  0 or 1: 0 means the statement turns outnt%1 ' (nt%1,1 , nt%1,2 , . . . ,nt%1,Kt )
to be false and 1 means it is true. There are   possible outcomes, denoted . 2Kt nt%1(k) , k'1, 2,..., 2
Kt
11
 Keep in mind the timing: we observe  at the end of date t. To write a simple transition we assume   dependsQt Qt
upon the parameter bt. 
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We now introduce a subjective map from vectors  to valuations . These reflect thent%1 Φi(nt%1)
quantitative evaluation by trader i of the effect of each possible qualitative outcome on future values of
. This is an independent estimate of how different trader i believes would be from(Qt%1 & λQ Qt) Qt%1
the stationary forecast. Finally, the trader attaches subjective probabilities to each of(a i1 , a i2 , . . . ,a i2Kt)
the qualitative outcomes. This procedure results in agent i making an alternate subjective estimate of
 based only on the qualitative data at his disposal:(Qt%1 & λQ Qt)
          .Ψ
i
t '
j
2Kt
k ' 1
a
i
k Φ
i(nit%1(k))
Since by (13a) the long term average of   is zero, we argue later that rationality requires(Qt%1 & λQ Qt)
the  are zero mean random variables. Although public data consist only of  , the procedure
Ψt Qt
outlined shows that in a world with diverse beliefs traders endogenously create subjective quantitative
measures which reflect their beliefs. We incorporate such a measure in the Bayesian procedure below.
3.5.2 A Bayesian Model: Beliefs are Markov State Variable
As assumed earlier, under the true probability Π, the value  has a true transition of a form11Qt
.Qt & λQQt&1 ' bt % ρ
Q
t , ρ
Q
t - N(0 , 1
β
)
bt is an exogenous, time varying mean value function. Traders do not know the parameter  bt  and at
the start of the first decision date t (w.l.g. let t = 1) they have two pieces of information. They know
 and they also have qualitative information . To start the process eachQt&1 (C(t)1 , C(t)2 , . . . ,C(t)Kt )
trader uses both sources at date  t  to form a prior belief about  bt  (before knowing ) which isQt
 .bt - N(b ,
1
α
)
This prior belief is then the basis for his demand function at the initial date t. The changing parameter 
bt  leads to the problem outlined earlier. When is observed trader i updates his belief toQt&λQQt&1
. But trader i needs an estimate of . Hence, how does he go from  to a newE it (bt |Qt ) bt%1 E it (bt |Qt )
prior  of ?  Without any new information and given the constant b,  his prior belief of E it (bt%1 |Qt ) bt%1
 will remain . Indeed, since Bayesian learning draws its inference from the past, itbt%1 E
i
t (bt |Qt )
cannot offer a method of updating one’s belief about a future value of a changing sequence of
parameters. To supplement this we now use the qualitative information (C(t%1)1 , C(t%1)2 , . . . , C(t%1)Kt%1)
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released at the start of date t+1 but before trading. These lead to subjective measures  which are,Ψit%1
in fact, estimates of . Now our trader has two independent sources for a prior on : bt%1 bt%1 E
i
t (bt |Qt )
and  which must be reconciled. Under a Bayesian approach we thus assume:Ψit%1
Assumption (*): Trader i uses a subjective probability  to form his date t+1 prior belief which is thenµ
(22) .E it (bt%1 |Qt , Ψit%1) ' µE it (bt |Qt ) % (1&µ)Ψit%1 0 < µ < 1
This assumption is the new added element that permits  to be upgraded into a prior belief atE it (bt |Qt )
date t+1, ,  before  is observed. We can now show the following:E it (bt%1 |Qt , Ψit%1) Qt%1
Theorem 3: Suppose  and Assumption (*) holds. Then for large values of  t  theΨit - N(0 , 1
γ
)
posterior   is a Markov state variable such that if we define  and E it (bt |Qt ) g it ' E it (bt |Qt ) µ ' λQ
then   holds:  (22) implies (10).g it%1 ' λZg it % ρigt%1
Proof:  At t = 1 the prior is   and given Qt the trader updates it in a standard Bayesianbt - N(b ,
1
α
)
procedure yielding
 .E it ( bt |Qt) '
αb % β[ Qt&λQQt&1]
α % β
Note that due to the timing of information there is no new information that becomes available before
the end of date t. Hence, a trader makes his forecast of  with   . Qt E it ( bt&1 |Qt&1 )
At the start of date t+1 and before trading the subjective measure   of qualitative dataΨit%1
becomes available. By the Assumption (*) the expected parameter under the new prior at t+1 is 
.
ˆE it (bt%1 |Qt ,Ψit%1 ) ' µ E it ( bt |Qt) % ( 1&µ )Ψit%1 , 0 <µ < 1
Denote by  . Then the prior is  ζ ' 1
µ2
and ξ ' 1
( 1&µ )2
.bt%1 - N( ˆE
i
t (bt%1 |Qt ,Ψit%1 ) , 1
ζ (α%β ) % ξγ )
Now the trader observes   and based on this observation updates his belief toQt%1&λQQt
 .E it%1(bt%1 |Qt%1 ) '
(ζ (α%β ) % ξγ ) [ µ E it (bt |Qt ) % (1&µ )Ψit%1 ] % β[ Qt%1&λQQt]
ζ (α%β ) % (ξγ % β )
At the start of date t+2 the trader generates a new value  leading to t+2 belief thatΨit%2
.
ˆE it%2 ( bt%2 |Qt%1 ,Ψit%2 ) ' µ E it%1 (bt%1 |Qt%1 ) % (1&µ )Ψit%2 , 0 <µ < 1
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When is observed the updated belief is thenQt%2&λQQt%1
 .E it%2 (bt%2 |Qt%2 ) '
[ζ2(α%β)% (ξγ%β)
j
1
n'0
ζ
n
&β][µ E it (bt%1|Qt%1)% (1&µ)Ψit%2]%β[Qt%2&λQQt%1]
ζ
2(α%β)% (ξγ%β )
j
1
n'0
ζ
n
By induction we iterate forward to conclude that
E it%N (bt%N |Qt%N ) '
[ζN&1(α%β)% (ξγ%β)
j
N&1
n'0
ζ
n
&β]
ζ
N(α % β)% (ξγ%β )
j
N&1
n'0
ζ
n
[µE it (bt%N&1 |Qt%N&1 )% (1&µ)Ψit%N] %
 + .
β [ Qt%N&λQQt%N&1]
ζ
N(α%β) % (ξγ%β )
j
N&1
n'0
ζ
n
Now take the limit. Since , as N increases  hence we find that t+1 posterior converges toζ > 1 ζN 6 4
 .E it%1(bt%1 |Qt%1) ' µ E it (bt |Qt ) % (1&µ )Ψit%1
Define ,  and note that   .  Together, these twog it 'E
i
t (bt |Qt) µ'λZ ρigt%1' (1&µ)Ψit%1-N(0, (1&µ)2/γ)
statements prove (10). 
Theorem 3 shows that as the Qt  data set increases, there is nothing new to learn. But this means that
although the posterior does not converge its law of motion converges to a time invariant law defined
by (10). The posterior fluctuates forever, providing the foundations for the dynamics of market belief,
and the fluctuations follow a simple Markov transition. New data Qt and  alter the conditionalΨit%1
probability of the trader, but these do not change the dynamic law of motion of  . g it
4. Contrasting the Models: PI vs. HB
We discussed in Section 1 the natural objections to an excessive use of the assumption of PI.
We now complete the comparison between the two theories and their empirical implications based on
the analytic results of the two models.
4.1 Sharp Differences in Asset Pricing Implications
The striking difference between the two theories are revealed by their equilibrium price maps.
Hence they lead to different characteristics of all phenomena which depend upon price dynamics, such
as market volatility, risk premia, etc. We thus examine the difference between the maps (1a)-(1c) under
12
 Some (e.g. Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005b)) bypass this theorem by not carrying out the full inference and
instead making the arbitrary assumption that the information structure in a noisy REE is of finite memory.
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PI and (21a)-(21d) under HB. Prices (1a)-(1c) under PI have infinite memory, a generic property of any
learning. This follows from a theorem which says that if some components of a Markov process are
unobserved, the process without full observability becomes one of infinite memory12. Since learning in a
noisy REE with PI is driven by unobserved supply shocks, the inference utilizes all past prices which are
proxies for these shocks. The infinite memory of prices arises despite the fact that the exogenous
shocks have no memory at all. In addition, since private signals are independent they are averaged out
and the average equals Q, the true value. Hence under PI price dynamics, risk premia and all other
endogenous phenomena which depend upon prices are driven only by market “fundamentals”: changes
in Qt and past supply shocks , all of which are unobservable. Indeed, noisy REES t ' (S1 , S2 , . . . ,St )
under PI leads to the peculiar result that prices depend on variables which nobody observes.
In contrast, the asset pricing theory under HB leads to an invariant price map which is defined
over the economy’s state variables, including the market state of belief, all of which are observable.
Hence, the pricing process is non-stationary only to the extent that state variables are non stationary.
Under HB the price does not reflect the unknown intrinsic value of the object since no one knows it and
pt forever fluctuate around their “fundamental” values. But there is a deeper principle involved here
which is orthogonal to any Rational Expectations thinking. In a market with HB agents never learn the
true structure of the economy and this leads to a simple principle. In an equilibrium with HB there is
one true stochastic law of motion of state variables but traders hold diverse beliefs about this dynamics.
Hence, most traders are wrong most of the time. Hence, under HB prices are determined by the
distribution of forecasting mistakes of the traders. Indeed, prices are functions of both the observed
exogenous variables as well as the market’s belief about the future. But the market belief is the
aggregation of individual assessments, including all mistaken assessments. As a result, under HB the
price space is larger than under PI and price volatility is greater than the volatility implied by exogenous
shocks. Kurz (1974), (1997a) and Kurz and Wu (1996) call this component of market risk
“Endogenous Uncertainty.” Samuelson expressed the intuition of this formal result by noting that “the
market has predicted ten of the last six recession.”  Recall under HB agents do all the learning they can
from past data and past data is ample, hence both heterogeneity and price volatility are persistent.
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4.2 Difference in Beauty Contest Implications
A great deal has been written about the Keynesian Beauty Contest metaphor. In the context of
the PI model with N rounds of trading one can rewrite (1c) in the form 
 (23)       p1 ' ¯E1¯E2 . . . ¯EN( Q) &
Var1(p2 )
τ
S1
Allen, Morris and Shin (2003) associate this equation with the Beauty Contest since in a noisy REE the
price today reflects tomorrow’s (i.e. next round) average market forecast of the fundamental value Q.
This is much too narrow interpretation of the “Beauty Contest.” An examination of this idea, as
explained by Keynes (see Keynes (1936), page 156), shows that the crux of Keynes’s conception is that
there is little merit in the idea of using fundamental values as a yardstick for market valuation. Hence
what matters for the market pricing of an asset is what the market believes the future price of that asset
will be rather than what the intrinsic value of the asset will be. Moreover, Keynes insists future price
depends upon future market beliefs which may be right or wrong but have no necessary relation to
fundamental values. Hence, one must interpret the “Beauty Contest” as Keynes’ statement that the
price today is determined by today’s market belief about the forecasts of the market’s investors
tomorrow, when such forecasts may be “right” or “wrong.” The Allen, Morris and Shin (2003)
interpretation does not rise to this level of subtlety required of the “Beauty Contest” idea.  Finally, the
idea of “trading rounds” is a modeling construct and as the number of rounds increases the private
information market leads to full revelation hence, with time,  p = Q. When this is the case, traders do
not engage in any “Beauty Contest”at all, which makes any “Beauty Contest” temporary. 
Another line of thinking in the literature about the Beauty Contest often stresses the role of
higher order expectations. This is entirely misleading since higher order expectations are intrinsic
mathematical properties of a probability measure over future sequences. Indeed, conditions (1a)-(1b)
imply iterated higher order expectations and this is true with and without PI or HB (see also Townsend
(1978),(1983)). The idea that higher order beliefs “are important” in some sense is no more than the
statement that investors hold probability beliefs about future sequences.
We now examine the HB perspective of the Beauty Contest, keeping in mind the fact that the
unknown value Qt is announced at the end of each date. To enable full comparison with the PI model
suppose for the moment that we discard the hedging demand and assume our traders are short lived. In
that case demand function (1c) would apply and we would write it in the dynamic context as\
 (24a) .pt ' ¯Et( pt%1 ) &
G1
τ
S
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Insert into (24a) the corresponding equilibrium map under HB which would remain of the functional
form )  to havept%1' ˆC1 ( Qt%µ )% ˆC2 Zt%1& ˆC3 S
(24b)     .pt ' ˆC1 ( ¯Et [Qt ] % µ ) % ˆC2 ¯Et [Zt%1 ] & ( ˆC3 %
G1
τ
) S
Compare (24b) with the price maps (1a)-(1b) under PI which depends upon Q and the supply shocks
p1 ' κ1 (λ1y% µ1 Q & S1 )
.p2 ' κˆ2 ( ˆλ2y% µˆ2 Q & S2 % ψS1)
In (24b) the price at t is a function of the market expectation of Qt and of Zt+1, the market belief state at
date t+1. The crux of the HB theory says that the root causes of Endogenous Uncertainty are the
mistakes markets make in pricing assets too high or too low, leading to excess volatility. The term
 in the price map (24b) says the price today depends upon today’s risk perception of the¯Et [Zt%1 ]
mistaken assessment the market may collectively make tomorrow. This risk is central to any theory with
HB. This, in our view, is the essence of the Keynesian Beauty Contest.
In short, the difference between the PI and the HB perspectives of the  Beauty Contest is very
sharp. Under PI the price is a function of the true fundamental value which is unknown to anyone.
Under HB, the price depends upon the market expectation of Qt and and of Zt+1. But market belief may
be right or wrong hence it may cause the asset to be overpriced or underpriced. This fear of future price
volatility induced by future market beliefs, which we call “Endogenous Uncertainty,” is therefore at the
heart of the “Beauty Contest” phenomenon.
4.3 Difference in Rationality Assumptions and Restrictions: Rational Beliefs
Up to now we compared the PI model with the HB model without specifying any restrictions on
information or requiring restrictions on beliefs. We criticized the PI theory for permitting arbitrary,
unobservable, private signals and introducing contrived random supply shocks. These make it possible
to prove anything with a model with PI. One may make a similar argument against HB, claiming that
with HB one can prove anything. This last argument is false for two reasons. First, since the distribution
of market belief is observable, hypotheses about the impact of market beliefs are testable. Second, we
have defined individual beliefs to be about deviations from the empirical distribution and this, by itself,
places restrictions on beliefs. Indeed, it is essential that we seek additional a priori restrictions on beliefs
in order to further narrow down the empirical implications of the theory given the specified information.
Recall that at t trader  i  knows his own but he does not observe any past values of  for all(g it , g it&1 ) g kτ
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k. He does observe the distribution of  for all dates up to t.  This is an assumption of anonymity. g k
τ
The theory of Rational Belief (in short, RB) due to Kurz (1994), (1997a) proposes natural
restrictions on beliefs. In a sequence of papers the theory has been applied to various markets (e.g.
Kurz (1996), (1997a), (1997b), Kurz and Schneider (1996), Kurz and Wu (1996), Kurz, Jin and
Motolese (2005b), Motolese (2001), (2003) Nielsen (1996), (2003), Wu and Guo (2003), (2004)). In
relation to the equity risk premium, Kurz and Beltratti (1997), Kurz and Motolese (2001), and Kurz,
Jin and Motolese (2005a) explain the equity premium by asymmetry in the distribution of beliefs. 
A belief is a Rational Belief if it is a probability model of the observed market variables which,
if simulated, reproduces the known empirical distribution. An RB is thus a model which cannot be
rejected by the empirical evidence. We specified beliefs with the perception models (14a) -(14b). For
these to be RB they must induce the assumed empirical distribution (13a)-(13b). But this requires that
(25)  The empirical distribution of  = the distribution of  
λ
g
Qg
i
t %ρ
iQ
t
λ
g
Zg
i
t %ρ
iZ
t%1
ρ
Q
t
ρ
Z
t%1
-N
0
0
,
σ
2
Q, 0,
0, σ2Z
, i.i.d.
To compute the moments of the empirical distribution of the market variables  implied(Qt&1 ,Zt)
by the model (14a) -(14b), one treats the   symmetrically with other random variables. From (10),g it
the unconditional variance of   isg it
  .Var(g i ) ' σ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
Hence, we have the following rationality conditions on the moments, which follow from (25):
(i)  (ii)  (iii)  (λ
g
Q )2σ2g
1 & λ2Z
% σˆ
2
Q ' σ
2
Q
(λgZ )2σ2g
1 & λ2Z
% σˆ
2
Z ' σ
2
Z
λ
g
Qλ
g
Zσ
2
g
1 & λ2Z
% σˆZQ ' 0
    (iv)    (v) .    (λ
g
Q )2λZσ2g
1 & λ2Z
% Cov(ρˆiQt , ρˆiQt&1 ) ' 0
(λgZ )2λZσ2g
1 & λ2Z
% Cov(ρˆiZt , ρˆiZt&1 ) ' 0
The first three conditions pin down the covariance matrix in (14a)-(14b). The last two pin down the
serial correlation of the two terms . An inspection of (14a)-(14b) reveals the only choice left( ρˆiQt , ρˆiZt )
for a trader are the two free parameters . But under the RB theory these are not completely(λgQ , λgZ )
free either. The requirements that  place two strict conditions on :σˆ2Q > 0 , σˆ
2
Z > 0 (λgQ , λgZ )
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       .|λgQ | <
σQ
σg
1 & λ2Z |λgZ | <
σZ
σg
1 & λ2Z
Next, to ensure the covariance matrix in (14a)-(14b) is positive definite one must impose an additional
condition. A condition such as
    
1 & λ2Z
σ
2
g
>
(λgZ)
2
σ
2
Z
%
(λgQ)
2
σ
2
Q
is sufficient. Finally, if one accepts the Bayesian procedure in Section 3.5 as the basis for (10), one can
also insist on the restriction , but this restriction does not flow from the basic RB condition.λgQ ' 1
Within the Bayesian framework we would also insist that the time average of the distinct valuations
under qualitative assessment be zero as they would measure only deviations from the stationary
forecast. We then see that the "free" parameters  are restricted to a rather narrow range.(λgQ , λgZ )
4.4 Difference in Testable Implications
In Section 1 we explored the assumptions of the PI theory. Since neither the private signals nor
the supply noise are observable, the PI theory lacks testable implications. The model’s key implication
is the price map which results from the informational assumptions which are contrived and implausible.
In contrast, the model under HB is entirely testable since all central components of the theory
are observable, including the average market belief. Data on the variables Zt  are constructed exactly as
required by averaging (11).  In a standard asset pricing equilibrium one can then write down the Euler
equations of the agents, aggregate them and use the market data on returns, asset prices and market
beliefs for a full identification. Recent examples of work where this has been done include Fan (2005)
and Kurz and Motolese (2005). These papers show that with data on asset returns and market belief an
asset pricing theory leads to specific testable restrictions. Moreover, by studying the excess returns on
different categories of assets (i.e. stocks, bonds, etc.) one derives sharp estimates of the market risk
premia of different assets and the effect of market beliefs on such premia. Clearly, the empirical
evidence is the decisive factor to reveal which of the two theories discussed here is superior. 
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